Paraphrasing the Summa: First part, Question 3, article 8

Article 8. Whether God enters into the composition of other things?

Are creatures made from God's Being?

*This is a very powerful question which I submit to the authority of the Catholic Church for whatever the answer might be.  I, don't understand the question or St. Thomas' answer.

Objection 1. It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things is that which is above being--the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the composition of other things.

God is said to be all-being.  In Him we live, move and are.  Therefore, creatures are made from God's Being.

Objection 2. Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [Serm. xxxviii) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.

In addition, God is a form.  But all forms are attached to substance.  Therefore, God is a compound.
*This one, in my opinion, fits better in the last set of objections (Question 3, Article 7).

Objection 3. Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor--whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each other.

*Primary matter is a philosophical concept which includes all material things.  If we ask, what are molecules made of, the answer would be, atoms.  If we ask, what are atoms made of, the answer would be electrons, protons and neutrons.  But what are those made of?  Quarks?  And what are those made of?  Primary matter.  

This objection equates Primary matter with God.  And says that everything is made from God's substance.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part with part."

St. Thomas quotes St. Dionysius saying that there is no way that a creature can even touch God, much less, mingle his substance with the Divine nature.

Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).

And quotes Aristotle saying the same thing.

I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle.

Then he makes reference to three errors explained by St. Augustine, wherein, some philosophers have described God as the soul of the universe.  But a soul is a combination of body and spirit.  And God has no substance, thus no body.  And therefore, God is not the soul of the universe.

First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. 

First, God is the Creator.   The Creator should not be confused with the creature as though they were one entity.  As a human father begets a human son, they have the same nature.  But, individually, they are separate and should not be confused, they are different individuals.

But primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual.

But primary matter is not the Creator.  It is a creature which was made by the Creator.  It is not the Maker or First Actor, but it is acted upon.

Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound.

Second, God is the First Cause and by nature, active.  Creatures are compound of matter and spirit.  And they act, basically, because the spirit moves the matter.  As the spiritual soul moves the body in a human being.

Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings--not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound.

Both the substance and the shape are the most important parts of any complex being.

For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing (3, 1):

Because substance is always at rest and therefore always secondary to that which activates it.

while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form;

While the shape of a substance serves only the purpose for which it is intended.

and as that which participates is posterior to that which is essential,

The only essential or necessary Being is God.  Therefore, he is making a reference to creatures, participated beings, being secondary to the only essential Being, God.

so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. 

The only fire which we know that is eternal is God, the consuming fire (Heb 12:29).

Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (2, 3).

Therefore, all creatures are secondary to God.

Reply to Objection 1. The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.

St. Thomas says that although God is considered all being, He is such only as their Creator, not as part of their nature or substance.

Reply to Objection 2. The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.

All things are made in the image of God.  But not according to substance or matter.

Reply to Objection 3. Simple things do not differ by added differences--for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something." Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.

*I don't really get the distinction he is making between diverse and different.  But I do get the gist of the answer.

God is absolutely different from primal matter.  Primal matter is a physical substance and God is not made of any physical substance.

Paraphrasing the Summa: First part, Question 3, article 7

Article 7. Whether God is altogether simple?

 *This is not asking whether God is gullible or stupid.  It is asking whether God is complex or composed of various parts, like an organism.  So, we can phrase it differently.

Is God an organism?  Is God made of component parts?

Objection 1. It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple.

The first objection says that since all things which God has made are evidence of God's existence.  They point to God and are somehow, like God.  And God has not made anything which does not have component parts.  Therefore, God must also be made of component parts.  So, God must be complex.

Objection 2. Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is altogether simple.

Simple organisms are considered the least of the creatures of earth.  Complex organisms, like humans, are considered higher beings in the evolutionary chain.  Therefore, since the best of all things is attributed to God, God must be the most complex Being of all.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and absolutely simple."

St. Thomas refers to St. Augustine who, in his book "on the Trinity", said, "God is truly and absolutely simple".

I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways.

He continues to say that God is lacking in any complexity whatsoever and this can be proven...

First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple.

In  Question 3, Article 2, we discussed that God has no substance.  We also discussed in the previous article (Question 3, Article 6) that God has no unnecessary properties (accidents).  Therefore, we know that God is not complex at all, but absolutely .

Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above (Question 2, Article 3).

Second, all complex things are put together.  They depend upon their parts.  Therefore, their parts must precede them. But God is the First Cause and nothing precedes Him.

Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (Question 2, Article 3), since He is the first efficient cause.

All complex things must be put together by an external force, they can't build themselves.  But God is the First Cause and Himself was not made or created by any other.

Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole.

In complex creatures, one part moves another.  But God is not made of any parts and has no substance.  God is Spirit and Life.  God actuates everything else.

Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts.  And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. 

The complex whole can not be predicted by one of its pieces or components.
* An example of this, might be a trunk.  Elephants have trunks.  But so do some mice, seals and other creatures, also have trunks.  So, we can't predict that an animal is an elephant simply because it has a trunk.

But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water),

But all parts of air are air and all parts of water are water.

nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits.

But if you take a cup of water from  a larger quantity, you can't tell whether the amount of the larger quantity.

Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself.

So, you can't predict the whole from the part.

But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself.

*What does he mean by, "even if this could be said of whatever has a form...?  That you can't predict the whole from the part?  God is a simple form, as St. Thomas said previously (Question 3, Article 6).

I think what he is doing is separating the substance from the form.  Therefore, he uses the example of a white object.  Now, in a previous article, he spoke of the form as the "goodness" of the object.  Or, as I paraphrased it, the "use" of the object (Question 3, Article 2, I answer that).

Therefore, he seems to be saying that, although the substance is constituted of parts, yet the whole was made for one purpose and all its components serve that one purpose.

And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite.

But God is a simple form.   He is not composite in anyway, so this is even more true of God.  If all parts of a composite being have only one form, then God, who is not composite and has no material, must only be one Form.

 Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim."

*I understand this better in the way St. Therese of Lisieux (Letters) said it.  She said that "God's justice is pure love and God's love is pure justice."  So, we can go on to understand that God's power is pure love and God's love is pure power.  Etc. etc.   God is not one part power, another part justice and another part love.  God doesn't love at one time and stop loving at another.   Even when we are being punished, God is loving us.  

Reply to Objection 1. Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (4, 3).

In Question 4, Article 3, St. Thomas will show that created things must, by nature, be composite.

Reply to Objection 2. With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing (4, 1 and 6, 2).

Objection 2 said that composite things are more perfect than simple things.  St. Thomas counters that created things are made more perfect by additional improvements added to them.  But God's perfection is absolute.  Again, he will prove this in upcoming lessons. 

Paraphrasing the Summa: First part, Question 3, article 6

Article 6. Whether in God there are any accidents?

*Accidents - He's not talking about mistakes.  Although, in God, there are no mistakes either.  St. Thomas is referring to nonessential properties.  Accidents are nonessentials.  Such as, it is not not essential for the definition of human that they be American.    Therefore, American is a nonessential property of some humans.

Since we are Catholic, we believe that having a rational soul is essential to being a human.  I believe, that is possibly the only essential that is recognized for a human.  

So, we could paraphrase this to say:

Whether all God's properties are essential to His Being God? 

Objection 1. It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance can not be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.

The first objection says that God's properties are nonessential because they are shared by many.  Thus, God is wise.  But so are some men.  Therefore, we can't say that God is God because He is wise.

Objection 2. Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God--which is absurd.

The second objection says that nonessential properties abound and   are shared by many creatures.  But all creatures can be traced to a first of its kind.  If there are many Firsts, then there are many Gods.  And this is not true.
*That objection, sort of disproves itself, in my opinion.

On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.

To understand this, we must define the word, "subject".  Subject means many things but the meaning in context of this statement is, "material or substance".

From Merriam Webster's online dictionary:

Full Definition of SUBJECT

1

:  one that is placed under authority or control: as 

a  :  vassal

b (1)  :  one subject to a monarch and governed by the monarch's law (2)  :  one who lives in the territory of, enjoys the protection of, and owes allegiance to a sovereign power or state 

2

a  :  that of which a quality, attribute, or relation may be affirmed or in which it may inhere 

b  :  substratum; especially  :  material or essential substance....

We know, from Question 3, Article 2, that God is not a material  nor a substance.  So, St. Thomas counters with the fact that only materials or substances have nonessential properties.  Therefore, God can not have those.

I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God.

Therefore, God can not have nonessential properties.

First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown (2, 3).

First, substances are, in a manner of speaking, defined by their nonessential properties.  Thus, a human being has 10 fingers and toes. But so do most apes.

But God does not have nonessential properties by which He might be defined.  God is Divine.  Only God is Divine.  God is immortal.  Only God is immortal.  God is all knowing.  Only God is all knowing.  These are all ESSENTIAL properties of God. 

Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat.

God is absolute.  Nothing can be added to Him because He needs nothing and possesses everything.

Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.

God is essential to all creation.  Therefore, He is the First Cause of all things in creation.  Therefore, those things which are nonessentials in creatures are caused by God's essential nature.  Nothing can be caused in God, but God is the cause of all things.

Reply to Objection 1. Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in us.

The properties which we share in common with God are nonessentials in us.  But they are essentials in God.

Reply to Objection 2. Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of every genus.

I don't think he means, "prior in time".  I think he means, "in order of importance".  Thus, men (substance) have ten fingers and toes (accidents).   But, if a man does not have ten fingers and toes, he is not declassified to another species or substance.  

But God is not a substance.  So, He has no accidents and this objection does not apply to God.

Paraphrasing the Summa: First part, Question 3, article 5

Article 5. Whether God is contained in a genus?

Is God one of a group?  In other words, is there more than one God?

Objection 1. It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.

God is a divine thing first and then God.  Therefore, God exists in a group.

Objection 2. Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.

In addition, all things are comparable to other like things.  But God is not measured by any other thing.  Therefore, God is a type of divinity.

On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not in any genus.

St. Thomas says otherwise.  To the human mind, categories or groups precede individuals.  But God is before anything.  God is beyond any category or group which man can invent.

I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways.

There are two ways in which creatures can be grouped.  Either by a attributes they hold in common, such as human beings and monkeys, because of attributes they have in common, are specific beings under the the category of primate.  Or by attributes they don't hold, such as lacking the quality of sight, makes one blind, whether one is human or monkey.  Thus, there are sightless monkeys as well as sightless humans.

But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways.

But God is in neither of those groups.  This can be proved in three ways.

First, because a species is constituted of genus and difference.

Kinds within a group are identified by their differences.

Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality.

Within the group (genus), the various kinds (species) differ one from the other in the same degree as "that which is" to "that which could be".

*I know that "evolution" has a bad connotation to Christians, but, I get the impression that is what St. Thomas is talking about here.  Let's take the genus of primate.  All primates have hands, similar styled faces and exhibit similar behaviors.  So, to distinguish between them are the differences.  And these differences are almost evolutionary.  Monkeys have more unactualized potential than humans.  They are less evolved.

For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature.

Beasts are, by nature, sentient.  All beasts have the capacity to feel.

Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature,

Intelligent beings have intelligence.   Intelligent beings have the capacity to think logically.

and intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality.

And the capacity to think has the same relationship to the capacity to feel as reality has to possibility.

*Again, I see here a relationship of evolution.  Animals have the capacity to feel but have not evolved the capacity to think.

The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species.

But, God is different.  There is nothing and no one to whom He can be compared and everything is true to Him.  As the Scripture says, "Everything is possible with God" (Matt 19:26).

Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus.

The second proof is this.  God's Divinity is His Reality, His Being.  If God were categorized, it would be as "Reality" because that is what He Is.  But, in order to categorize something, there must be a difference attributed to it within that category.  But since there is nothing and no one else which can be compared to God, then God can't be grouped or categorized.

Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity--i.e. essence--must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition.

In a group or category, all share a certain nature within that group.  But, within that nature, they differ in real terms, they differ in being. Thus, a horse differs from a man, though they are both grouped with animals.

But, there is no other Being who can be grouped with God.  God is one and there is no other besides Him.

That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.

God can not be categorized.  Because God is reality itself.  Therefore, all things exist in God and God can not be contained in one category.

Reply to Objection 1. The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself--for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way--namely, of existing of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.

Reality is not a group.  Because that which is not "real" does not exist.  Therefore, reality is not a group.

On the other hand, the word "material" (i.e. substance) points not only to those things which are physically real, but also to those things which are made up of certain elements.  But there is a difference between their being and their nature.

In other words, gold is, by nature, hard.  But so is granite.

Reply to Objection 2. This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles Him.

God is the measure of all things but God Himself can not be measured.  Therefore, man can not conceive the magnitude of God's Being.  And can not, therefore, put God in any category or group.  God is beyond man's ability to comprehend.

Paraphrasing the Summa: First part, Question 3, article 4

Article 4. Whether essence and existence are the same in God?

Is God's Divinity the same as God's Being?

Objection 1. It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wisdom 14:21). Therefore God's existence is not His essence.

The first objection says that God's Divinity is not His Being because,  God is Who Is.  In other words, God is said to be all which exists.  Therefore, nothing can be added to God.  But this is not true because men are forbidden from worshipping created things.  Therefore, God's Divinity does not extend to all beings.  And so, God's Divinity is not the same as His Being.

Objection 2. Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above (I:2:2); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence--that is, as His quiddity or nature.

Objection 2 says that we can know that God exists.  Therefore, we know His Being.  But we our mind can not comprehend God's nature. Therefore, God's Being and God's Divinity, are not the same.

On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.

St. Hilary of Poitier, in his book "on the Trinity" says that God is self sufficient (subsisting).   Therefore, God is Divine.  In other words, there is only one God.  Only one Divine Nature.  And that is God's Being.

I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways.

St. Thomas says that in Question 3, Article 3, he proved that God is His own essence because there can only be one Eternal Being.

Now,  he will prove that God is also His own Being.

First, whatever a thing has besides its essence

1.  Whatever a creature has beyond its nature

 must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence 

must be the result EITHER, of those parts which make up that nature.

(like a property that necessarily accompanies the species--as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man--and is caused by the constituent principles of the species),

For example, laughter is proper to humankind because of his psychological  make up.

Another example might be that man stands erect because of his physical build.

or by some exterior agent--as heat is caused in water by fire.

 OR they might be the result of some outside principle acting upon the creature.  For example, fire causes water to heat up.

Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles.

Therefore, he says, if a creature's being differs from his nature, it is because something in his nature causes this difference or because of an action from an outside principle.

Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused.

But no creature can bring itself into being.   A creature's nature does not have the power to bring itself into being.  His being must be caused by an outside principle.

Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence.

But that is not true of God.  Because God is the First Cause of all things.  Therefore, God's Divinity can not differ from His Being.

Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above (Article 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence.

2 .  Being makes all things real.  Purpose and mankind can be addressed because they are real.  Therefore, being is directly related to nature when the two differ.  As the possibility of something happening is to the reality of that thing happening.  But in God, all is real.  God is not a possibility.  God truly exists and has always existed and will always exist.  Therefore, there is no difference between God's nature and His Being.

Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above (Article 3) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being--which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.

All creatures exist because God is real.  And we owe our existence to God's Being.  But God does not owe His Being to anything or anyone.  Therefore, God's divinity is His Being.

Reply to Objection 1. A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.

Objection 1 says that God's nature can not be the same as His Being because God's Being is supposed to be all that exists.  If everything exists in God, then it can not increase.  Yet, we are forbidden from worshipping creatures, therefore God's Divine nature does not extend to all which exists unless it increases.

St. Thomas says that there are two ways in which a nature can forbid increase.

1.  If, by nature, it can't increase.

God's Being can't increase, since by nature, God is all which exists.   And God is Divine, by nature.  Therefore, God's Divinity is the same as His Being.

2.  If, by nature, increase is not required.

God's Being is,  by nature, all which exists, therefore, it does not require to increase.  And God is Divine, by nature.  Therefore, God's Divinity is His Being.

 *To me, this does not answer the question of why we don't worship created things.  So, I'll venture to answer that myself.  

Scripture says that "God is He in whom we live, move and have our being (Acts 17:28)."  Therefore, God, being eternal, sustains all life with His own Being.  But, although we and all other creatures, exist in God, we are not Divine because our nature is different from God's.  Therefore, all creatures are mortal but God is eternal.  And that is why, we don't worship creatures.  Because there is only one Divine Being who is eternal.

Reply to Objection 2. "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is true; and this we know from His effects (I:2:2).

Objection #2 says that God's Being and Divinity are different because we can understand the former but not the latter.  St. Thomas says that we can't understand either.  Therefore, the argument is false.

In other words, knowing that God exists is not the same as comprehending the grandeur of His existence.  Therefore, our minds can not fully comprehend anything about God.

Paraphrasing the Summa: First part, Question 3, article 3

Article 3. Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?

Is God the same as His substance?

*This is a very interesting question, to me, because there are some who object to the idea that God is love.  Saying that God can not be reduced to a mere emotion.  However, love is an emotion in man.  But that emotion is merely a shadow of that essence of God.

Objection 1. It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of God--i.e. the Godhead--is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.

The Divinity of God is said to be in God.  Therefore, God and His Divinity are two different things.

Objection 2. Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.

*This is difficult, because I don't understand the word, "suppositum".  But we can ignore it and go on the context of the rest of the objection.   Now, we are familiar with the term, "Like from like, true God from true God."  So, let's go from there.

Objection 2 says that all things beget like things.  Therefore, dogs beget dogs and cats beget cats.  But, if we take an individual within any species, we find that the individual is unique and unlike any other. Therefore, my pet dog, is unlike any other dog. And a man, such as myself, is not the same as our human nature.  And Jesus Christ, God, is a man.  Therefore, He is not the same as His Godhead.

On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.

St. Thomas counters that God is life.  He is not just a living thing.  Divinity is to God as life is to a living thing.

I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature.

He says that God is the same as His substance.

To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species.

In short, he says that there is a difference between and individual of a species and the species itself.  But there is only one God, therefore God is His species.  He is the only member of His species.

For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is man.

Each individual man is unique.  Yet we all share the same form.

Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter--that is to say, to "this" matter--the very forms being individualized of themselves--it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting "supposita." Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.

Humanity and man are not identical because each man is an individual.  But God has no substance and shape because God is all being, therefore, God is identical with His Being.

Reply to Objection 1. We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.

We know things from experience.  And since we only know creatures made of complex substances, this is how we envision God.  We project this error unto God, but it is an error and not the truth about God.

Reply to Objection 2. The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.

God is infinite.  Therefore, those things which He created can only be similar to Him but are not exactly like Him.  Nor can they be.  Because God is infinite.  And there is only room for one infinite Being.  So, His creatures are finite.

Paraphrasing the Summa: First part, Question 3, article 2

Article 2. Whether God is composed of matter and form?

This question is very much related to Article 1, whether God has a body.  The answer to that question is, "no, God does not have a body."  A body is composed of matter and form.  God does not have a body, because God is not composed of matter and form.

Objection 1. It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (Hebrews 10:38), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

The first objection uses Scripture the same way that the last series of objections did in Article 1.  This one says that Scripture says that God has a soul.  A soul is defined as the combination of spirit and body.  Therefore, since Scripture is the Word of God, God must have a body attached to His soul.  And if God has a body, He has matter and form.

Objection 2. Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding angry with His people" (Psalm 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Again, Scripture is blamed for depicting God as angry and passionate.  Since these are attributes of men, then this objection concludes that God must have matter and form.

Objection 3. Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.

Again, bodies are composed of matter and form and are the reason why men are individuals.  Since God is referred to as an Individual, then He must have a body composed of matter and form.

On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.

St. Thomas says that anything composed of matter and form, is a body.   And in Article 1, we proved that God is not a body.

I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God.
First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (I:2:3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.

In Article 1, replies to objections 2 and 3, we showed that God is pure action.  He is never at rest.  And only bodies can be at rest.  Since bodies are composed of substance and shape.  And God can't have a body, then God is not made of substance and shape.

Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form;

*This doesn't make sense, unless we look at an example.  Let's talk about a particular type of matter and the many uses which it can be "formed" into.

Clay can be formed into cups, jugs, pots, bowls, dishes, ash trays, etc.  So, clay is the matter.  The form is the shape of the matter, so that would be either the form of a cup, pot, etc.  And the goodness (i.e. what its good for) of the form is the use to which it is put.  Therefore, goodness of a cup is as a container of liquid for drinking.  The goodness of a dish is a container of food for eating.

St. Thomas, then, is saying that the use (i.e. goodness) of a particular material is determined by the shape into which it is cast.

therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form.

By "participated", I think he means, "determined".   Therefore, the substance determines the use.  Again, let's look at an example.  We wouldn't use water as a cup.  Or wood to contain fire.  We could use clay for both of those purposes.

Now the first good and the best--viz. God--is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good.

We can't really speak of God as having a use nor as being good for this or that.  God is all good.  All goodness comes from God.  No one determines to what use God is to be put.  God determines to what use everything else is to be put.  God is the First Cause.

Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.

Since God is the First Cause, then it is impossible that He should be limited by a body.

Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.

God is all good and therefore can not be limited to a particular substance which would limit Him to a particular use.  God is infinite and thus formless.

Reply to Objection 1. A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.

God is said to be a soul because, a soul's actions resemble God's actions.  Therefore, that which is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.  I believe this is called a simile.  The actions resemble each other, but they are not the same.  Therefore, God does not have a soul.

Reply to Objection 2. Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.

In the same way, anger and passion are attributed to God in the same way.  Metaphorically.

Reply to Objection 3. Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter,

Shapes and molds which can be given to substances, are made unique by those substances.

which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject;

 And once a substance is thus shaped it is made unique and can not be duplicated.
*As in, no two snowflakes are alike.  

although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many.

We all recognize the shape and form of a snowflake.  Therefore, many individuals can receive the same form.  But each one is unique in some way.

But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.

But there is one Shape which can not be received by any substance because it is already Unique.  For there is only one God.